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_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.  
 
 In this appeal following the District Court’s dismissal 
of Appellant Thomas E. St. Pierre’s class action complaint, we 
consider a matter of first impression among the Courts of 
Appeals: whether unpaid highway tolls constitute the type of 
“debt” that could support a consumer claim under the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act.  Because we conclude they do not, 
we will affirm. 
 
I. Background1  
 
A. Factual Background  
 
 St. Pierre is a New Jersey resident and the registered 
owner of a car that he sometimes drives on New Jersey 
highways.  On those occasions, he is subject to New Jersey’s 
statutory toll requirements, including that “[n]o vehicle shall 
be permitted to make use of any highway project or part thereof 
                                                          
 1 As this appeal arises from the grant of 
a motion to dismiss, we accept as true the factual allegations in 
St. Pierre’s amended class action complaint.  See Bridge v. 
Phx. Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 642 n.1 (2008).  St. 
Pierre’s complaint was originally filed in New Jersey state 
court before the case was removed to the District Court in April 
2015.   
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operated by the New Jersey Turnpike Authority 
[(“Authority”)] . . . except upon the payment of such tolls, if 
any, as may from time to time be prescribed by the Authority,” 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 27:23-25, and that the owner of the vehicle is 
liable for the payment of highway tolls even if “such vehicle 
was used or operated” by someone other than the owner, id.       
§ 27:23-34.2(b). 
 
Like many car owners in New Jersey, St. Pierre chose 
to sign up for New Jersey E-ZPass (“E-ZPass”), an electronic 
toll payment program that facilitates toll collection. E-ZPass 
accountholders agree to certain terms and conditions (the “E-
ZPass Contract”), including that they maintain a positive 
balance in a prepaid E-ZPass account from which the toll fare 
is automatically deducted when they pass through an E-ZPass 
lane and that their “failure to pay charges posted to [their] 
[a]ccount, including tolls, may result in additional penalties as 
provided by law.”2  JA 66.  When St. Pierre’s E-ZPass account 
                                                          
 2 The New Jersey Administrative Code defines E-ZPass 
as an “Electronic toll collection system” (“ETC System”), 
which is an electronic system “employed or utilized by the 
Authority to register and collect the toll required to be paid for 
a vehicle entering a toll plaza owned and/or operated by, or 
upon the behalf of, the Authority.”  N.J. Admin. Code § 19:9-
9.1 (2010).  Through E-ZPass, “drivers can establish an 
account, prepay tolls and attach a small electronic device, 
called a tag or a transponder, to their vehicles.  Tolls are 
automatically calculated and deducted from the prepaid 
account as an E-ZPass customer passes through the toll lanes.”  
FAQ’s, NJ E-ZPass, 
https://www.ezpassnj.com/en/about/faqs.shtml (last visited 
July 12, 2018).  The Administrative Code also authorizes the 
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fell into arrears because he failed to maintain a positive 
balance, E-ZPass assigned it to Appellee Retrieval-Masters 
Credit Bureau, Inc. (“RMCB”), a private debt collection 
agency, which, in turn, sent St. Pierre a collection letter “for 
outstanding violations owed for toll evasions in the amount of 
$1,200.75.”3  JA 70.  At issue in this case, however, is not the 
letter itself but the envelope in which the letter was sent.  
Visible through the glassine window of that envelope was not 
only St. Pierre’s name and address, but also a “quick response” 
code4 and St. Pierre’s account number.   
                                                          
Authority to adopt a “form of contract” governing the 
responsibilities of ETC System subscribers, see N.J. Admin. 
Code § 19:9-9.2(h), which New Jersey E-ZPass has utilized by 
requiring its subscribers to agree to Terms and Conditions 
available by way of hyperlinks on its website.  Terms and 
Conditions, NJ E-ZPass, 
https://www.ezpassnj.com/en/about/i_terms.pdf (last visited 
July 12, 2018).   
 
 3 St. Pierre’s FDCPA claim is based only on this letter, 
which was sent on June 16, 2014.  RMCB also had sent St. 
Pierre a collection letter in an envelope disclosing the same 
information on November 11, 2013, attempting to recover 
$60.06 that “consisted of allegedly unpaid tolls and additional 
fees.”  Appellant’s Br. 4.  However, St. Pierre concedes that 
the FDCPA’s one-year limitations period, 15 U.S.C.                      
§ 1692k(d), had expired as to that letter by the time he filed his 
complaint on March 2, 2015.  
 
 4 Here, a “quick response” code is a code that, “when 
scanned by a device such as a smart phone, reveal[s] the same 
information as that displayed through the glassine window, as 
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 St. Pierre’s amended class action complaint alleges that 
the disclosure of these two pieces of information on the 
envelope violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
(“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a-1692p, which prohibits the 
use of any “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or 
attempt to collect any debt,” id. § 1692f, including “any 
language or symbol, other than the debt collector’s address, on 
any envelope when communicating with a consumer by use of 
the mails,” id. § 1692f(8).  That prohibition, however, applies 
only to the collection of a “debt,” which the FDCPA defines as 
an “obligation . . . of a consumer to pay money arising out of a 
transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or 
services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily 
for personal, family, or household purposes.”  Id. § 1692a(5).  
And there lies the crux of this appeal: Do unpaid highway tolls 
reflect a consumer’s “obligation . . . arising out of a transaction 
in which the . . . services which are the subject of the 
transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household 
purposes,” id., or a legal obligation in the nature of a tax that 
falls outside the scope of the FDCPA?  
 
The District Court concluded the latter.  Although it 
held as a threshold matter that St. Pierre had alleged an injury 
sufficiently “concrete” to confer Article III standing and, by 
extension, federal jurisdiction, St. Pierre v. Retrieval-Masters 
Creditors Bureau, Inc., No. 15-cv-2596, 2017 WL 1102635, at 
*6 (D.N.J. Mar. 24, 2017), it dismissed St. Pierre’s complaint 
on the ground that unpaid highway tolls do not constitute 
                                                          
well as a monetary amount corresponding to [a 
debtor’s] alleged debt.”  Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing, 
765 F.3d 299, 301 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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“debt” and therefore failed to state a claim for a violation of the 
FDCPA, id. at *10.   
 
 St. Pierre filed this appeal challenging the District 
Court’s characterization of the obligation to pay highway tolls, 
and RMCB cross-appealed, challenging the Court’s ruling on 
standing. 
 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  We review de novo both the District Court’s decision 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim, In re Lipitor Antitrust 
Litig., 868 F.3d 231, 249 (3d Cir. 2017), and its conclusion as 
to standing, Edmonson v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 725 F.3d 
406, 414 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 
III. Discussion 
 
 Because St. Pierre’s standing to bring this case 
implicates the Court’s jurisdiction, it must be resolved as a 
threshold matter.  Hartig Drug Co. v. Senju Pharm. Co., 836 
F.3d 261, 269 (3d Cir. 2016).  We therefore will address 
RMCB’s cross-appeal before turning to the merits of St. 
Pierre’s FDCPA claim.5  
                                                          
5 St. Pierre also cross-appealed, asserting that RMCB 
lacks standing to challenge this Court’s jurisdiction.  We need 
not tarry over that argument, for “[e]ven if the parties have not 
raised the issue” of standing, this Court would “examine its 
authority sua sponte during its review of the case.”  Samuel-
Bassett v. KIA Motors Am., Inc., 357 F.3d 392, 395-96 (3d Cir. 
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A. Standing 
 
 To establish standing, St. Pierre must allege facts 
demonstrating that he suffered (1) an injury-in-fact; (2) that is 
fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged conduct; and        
(3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial 
decision.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 590 
(1992).  RMBC argues that St. Pierre failed to make that 
showing because he alleged only a de minimis procedural 
violation of the FDCPA and not an injury-in-fact.  Although 
we previously held in Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing, 
765 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2014), that a debt collector’s disclosure 
of a debtor’s account number through a glassine window is not 
a de minimis violation, RMCB contends the Supreme Court’s 
interim decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 
(2016), casts doubt on that holding and requires denial of St. 
Pierre’s argument on standing grounds.  It does not. 
 
  In Spokeo, the Supreme Court provided a lens through 
which to determine whether an intangible injury is sufficiently 
“concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent” to 
qualify as an injury-in-fact.  136 S. Ct. at 1548.  We first ask 
“whether an alleged intangible harm has a close relationship to 
a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis 
for a lawsuit in English or American Courts.”  Id. at 1549.  If 
so, it is likely to satisfy the injury-in-fact element of standing; 
if not, we next ask whether Congress has expressed an intent 
to make an injury redressable by “elevat[ing] [it] to the status 
of [a] legally cognizable injur[y]” even if that injury was 
previously inadequate in law.  Id.  Here too, if Congress 
                                                          
2004); see Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 360 
n.9 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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expressed such an intent, the injury is likely to satisfy Article 
III.  Thus, while “a bare procedural violation, divorced from 
any concrete harm” will not suffice, “the violation of a 
procedural right granted by statute can be sufficient in some 
circumstances to constitute injury in fact.  In other words, a 
plaintiff in such a case need not allege any additional harm 
beyond the one Congress has identified.”  Id.  
 
 As we recently observed in In re Horizon Healthcare 
Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625 (3d Cir. 2017), 
however, Spokeo merely “reiterate[d] traditional notions of 
standing” and “reemphasize[d] that Congress has the power to 
define injuries that were previously inadequate at law,” rather 
than “erect[ing] any new barriers that might prevent Congress 
from identifying new causes of action though they may be 
based on intangible harms.”  Id. at 638 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  For that reason, we concluded in Horizon that 
“the improper disclosure of one’s personal data in violation of 
[the Fair Credit Reporting Act] is a cognizable injury for 
Article III standing purposes,” id. at 641, and that “the 
unauthorized dissemination of personal information . . . causes 
an injury in and of itself—whether or not the disclosure of that 
information increased the risk of identity theft or some other 
future harm,” id. at 639.  We also cited approvingly to our prior 
precedent—In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer 
Privacy Litigation, 806 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2015), where we held 
that claims “that the defendants, in the course of serving 
advertisements to their personal web browsers, implanted 
tracking cookies on their personal computers” alleged 
“concrete, particularized, and actual” injuries, id. at 134-35, 
and In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation, 827 F.3d 
262 (3d Cir. 2016), where we concluded that “the unlawful 
disclosure of legally protected information” constitutes “a 
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clear de facto injury,” id. at 272-74—identifying those as other 
examples of intangible but concrete injuries that Congress had 
defined to protect consumers.  Horizon, 846 F.3d at 636-39; id. 
at 642-43 (Shwartz, J., concurring).  
 
 Spokeo thus reinforces, rather than undermines, our 
holding in Douglass.  And that holding squarely resolves the 
standing issue here.  In Douglass, we observed that the 
exposure of a plaintiff’s account number through a glassine 
window6 “implicates a core concern animating the FDCPA—
the invasion of privacy”—and thus is closely related to harm 
that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a 
lawsuit in English and American courts.  Douglass, 765 F.3d 
at 303; see Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.  We also explained that 
even if § 1692f(8) contains a “benign language exception,” the 
exposure of a debtor’s account number through a glassine 
window “is not benign” because “we cannot find language 
exempt from § 1692f(8) if its disclosure on an envelope would 
run counter to the very reasons Congress enacted the FDCPA.”  
Douglass, 765 F.3d at 303.   
 
As Douglass controls here, the District Court properly 
concluded that a violation of § 1692f(8) is a legally cognizable 
injury that confers standing on St. Pierre. 
 
                                                          
 6 Here, as in Douglass, we need not reach the question 
whether exposure of the “quick response” code on the 
envelope, without more, would be sufficient to confer standing 
under the FDCPA because exposure of one’s account number 
itself suffices.  See Douglass, 765 F.3d at 301 n.4. 
11 
 
B.  Merits 
 Having satisfied ourselves of our jurisdiction, we turn 
to the substance of St. Pierre’s claim under the FDCPA.  The 
FDCPA, which is a remedial statute passed by Congress in 
1977 and geared towards eliminating abusive practices by debt 
collectors, creates a private right of action against debt 
collectors who violate its provisions.  15 U.S.C. § 1692k; see 
also Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 453 (3d Cir. 
2006).  “To prevail on an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must prove 
that (1) she is a consumer, (2) the defendant is a debt collector, 
(3) the defendant’s challenged practice involves an attempt to 
collect a ‘debt’ as the [FDCPA] defines it, and (4) the 
defendant has violated a provision of the FDCPA in attempting 
to collect the debt.”  Douglass, 765 F.3d at 303.   
  
Here, the only disputed prong is the “threshold 
requirement” that the prohibited collection practices relate to a 
“debt,” Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Grp., 834 F.2d 1163, 
1167 (3d Cir. 1987), which the FDCPA defines as “any 
obligation . . . of a consumer to pay money arising out of a 
transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or 
services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily 
for personal, family, or household purposes,” 15 U.S.C.               
§ 1692a(5).  As the terms “transaction” and “personal, family, 
or household purposes” are not further defined in the statute, 
the definition of “debt” has proven elusive.7  In an effort to pin 
                                                          
7 See, e.g., Rosenzweig v. Transworld Sys. Inc, No. 16-
227, 2017 WL 3025557, at *6 (D.N.J. July 14, 2017) (agreeing 
with the reasoning of the District Court here and concluding 
that highway tolls are not “debt” because “tolls are akin to 
taxes for using the particular route”); Yazo v. Law Enf’t Sys., 
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it down as to highway tolls, we review the few cases to date in 
which we have marked its bounds. 
 
1. Relevant Precedent Concerning 
FDCPA “Debt” 
 
 We have addressed the definition of FDCPA “debt” in 
only four cases.  In Staub v. Harris, 626 F.2d 275 (3d Cir. 
1980), we held that a delinquent per capita tax levied by a 
Pennsylvania taxing district against the plaintiffs was not 
“debt” encompassed by the FDCPA.  Id. at 278.  Without 
deciding whether the term “‘transaction’ as used in the FDCPA 
always connotes the existence of an underlying contractual 
relationship,” we concluded that, “at a minimum, the statute 
contemplates that the debt has arisen as a result of the rendition 
of a service or purchase of property or other item of value.”  Id.  
By contrast, “[t]he relationship between taxpayer and taxing 
authority,” we held, “does not encompass that type of pro tanto 
exchange which the statutory definition envisages” because tax 
revenue is a “public burden[] imposed generally upon the 
inhabitants” used for “nonpersonal purposes [such] as prisons, 
roads, defense, courts and other governmental services,” and 
“without reference to peculiar benefits to particular 
individuals[.]”  Id. (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1307 (5th 
ed. 1979)).  
 
                                                          
Inc., No. 08-cv-3512, 2008 WL 4852965, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 
7, 2008) (reasoning that because failure to pay highway tolls 
violates California law, the court “cannot conclude that the 
obligation to pay arose out of a consensual consumer 
transaction”).   
13 
 
 Next, in Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group, 834 F.2d 
1163 (3d Cir. 1987), we held that the obligation that arose out 
of allegedly abusive collection letters sent by defendant cable 
television companies attempting to collect a sum of money to 
settle potential tort claims against plaintiffs for the “illegal 
reception of HBO signals” was not “debt” under the FDCPA 
because the source of the obligation was an “asserted tort 
liability” rather than a consensual transaction.  Id. at 1165-68.  
While we recognized that “the concept of a ‘transaction’ is 
broader than that of a contract . . . nothing in the statute or the 
legislative history leads us to believe that Congress intended to 
equate asserted tort liability with asserted consumer debt” or, 
for that matter, that the FDCPA was intended to protect against 
“abusive practices in collecting tort settlements from alleged 
tortfeasors through threats of legal action.”  Id. at 1168.  
 
 Over a decade later, in Pollice v. National Tax Funding, 
L.P., 225 F.3d 379 (3d Cir. 2000), we addressed whether 
homeowners’ obligations to pay their property taxes, as well as 
their water and sewer utilities, qualified as “debt” under the 
statute.8  Id. at 401.  As for the property taxes, we held that 
                                                          
8 As we explain in Tepper v. Amos Fin., LLC, No. 17-
2851, --- F.3d ---- (3d Cir. Aug. 7, 2018), issued 
contemporaneously with this opinion, another aspect of 
Pollice—that is, our conclusion that the assignee of an 
obligation is a “debt collector” under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) if 
the obligation is in default at the time of the assignment, 225 
F.3d at 403—was recently abrogated by the Supreme Court in 
Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 
1718, 1721 (2017).  Henson, however, did not address the 
meaning of “debt” under § 1692a(5) and that aspect of Pollice 
remains valid and instructive for our purposes here. 
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“Staub [wa]s controlling” because “[u]nlike a sales tax, for 
example, which arguably arises from the sale transaction, the 
property taxes . . . arose not from the purchase of property but 
from the fact of ownership.”  Id. at 401-02.  We rejected the 
plaintiff’s attempt to distinguish Staub on the basis that “the 
tax obligations changed in character and became ‘debts’” when 
they were assigned to a private entity that was in the business 
of purchasing such claims, explaining that even after that 
assignment, “there still had not been a ‘transaction’ involving 
the homeowners; their obligation to pay [the private entity] still 
arose from the levying of taxes.”  Id. at 402.  We also 
concluded that the fact that the homeowners could pay their 
delinquent property taxes pursuant to a payment plan did not 
distinguish the nature of the property taxes from the per capita 
tax in Staub.  Id. at 403.  In that context, we explained, the 
payment plan itself was not the obligation but rather was 
“simply [] one aspect of defendants’ course of conduct in 
attempting to collect the original . . . obligations which were 
owed to the government entities[.]”  Id. at 402-03. 
 
 We had a different view, however, of the homeowners’ 
water and sewer utility obligations.  Those obligations, we 
held, did constitute FDCPA “debt” because “[a]t the time 
[they] first arose, homeowners (‘consumers’ of water and 
sewer services) had an ‘obligation . . . to pay money’ to the 
government entities which arose out of a ‘transaction’ 
(requesting water and sewer services) the subject of which was 
‘services . . . primarily for personal, family, or household 
purposes.’”  Id. at 400.  The consumer’s affirmative “request,” 
we explained, transformed the relationship between the 
15 
 
government and homeowner into a “transaction,”9 id., and the 
flow of the water directly into the household for personal 
consumption by the consumer rendered that transaction 
“primarily for personal, family, or household purposes,” id. 
(quoting 15 U.S.C.                 § 1692a(5)).  
 
 Finally, in Piper v. Portnoff Law Associates, Ltd., 396 
F.3d 227 (3d Cir. 2005), we again held that transactions 
involving utility services gave rise to “debt” because 
“whenever a homeowner voluntarily elects to avail himself of 
municipal water/sewer services, in whatever manner, and 
thereby incurs an obligation to pay for such services, there is 
the kind of pro tanto exchange contemplated by the FDCPA.”  
Id. at 233 n.8.  We also observed that “[t]he consensual nature 
of the transaction distinguishe[d] [Pennsylvania water and 
sewer service] from tax assessments which Pollice held to not 
be debts within the meaning of the FDCPA,” emphasizing that 
the consumer’s usage “was metered in the normal fashion and 
. . . the amount of their obligation to pay was based on the 
amount of water they chose to use.”  Id.    
   
                                                          
9 In clarifying that the homeowners’ water and sewer 
obligations constituted “debt” under the FDCPA “even though 
the government entities did not extend homeowners any right 
to defer payment of their obligations,” Pollice, 225 F.3d at 401, 
we also expressly “disavowed” our dictum in Zimmerman 
where we had stated that “the type of transaction which may 
give rise to a ‘debt’ as defined in the FDCPA” is 
“one involving the offer or extension of credit to a consumer,” 
id. (quoting Zimmerman, 834 F.2d at 1168) (emphasis 
omitted).   
16 
 
 From these cases, we distill a three-part test to evaluate 
whether an obligation constitutes “debt” under the FDCPA.  
First, we consider whether the underlying obligation “aris[es] 
out of a transaction,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5)—that is, a 
consensual exchange involving an affirmative “request,” 
Pollice, 225 F.3d at 400, and “the rendition of a service or 
purchase of property or other item of value,” Staub, 626 F.2d 
at 278, such as a contract—or whether, instead, it arises by 
virtue of a legal status—that is, an involuntary obligation 
attendant to the fact of having a specific legal status such as 
that of a property owner, see Pollice, 225 F.3d at 401, legal 
resident, see Staub, 626 F.2d at 278, or tortfeasor or other type 
of offender under criminal or civil law, see Zimmerman, 834 
F.2d at 1168.10   
                                                          
10 The other Courts of Appeals that have considered the 
meaning of FDCPA “debt” have likewise excluded from 
coverage those obligations that arise out of a legal status rather 
than a consensual exchange of goods or services.  See, e.g., 
Boyd v. J.E. Robert Co., 765 F.3d 123, 126 n.4 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(holding the obligation to pay water and sewer charges in New 
York City did not constitute “debt” because, unlike the 
“character” of the water and sewer obligations in Pollice, 
“nothing in the record here suggests that plaintiffs must 
‘request’ water and sewer services in order to be charged by 
the City.  Rather, the charges are levied automatically in 
connection with the property ownership”) (emphasis added); 
Gulley v. Markoff & Krasny, 664 F.3d 1073, 1074-75 (7th Cir. 
2011) (holding the obligation to pay government-imposed 
fines is not “debt” under the FDCPA because a “fine is a 
penalty imposed for breaking the law—not the result of a 
consensual transaction”); Hawthorne v. Mac Adjustment, Inc., 
140 F.3d 1367, 1371-72 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding the 
17 
 
Second, if we conclude that the obligation arises out of 
a transaction, we next identify what “money, property, 
insurance, or services . . . [] are the subject of the transaction,” 
15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5), i.e., what it is that is being rendered in 
exchange for the monetary payment.  And third, we consider 
the characteristics of that “money, property, insurance, or 
services” to ascertain whether they are “primarily for personal, 
family, or household purposes.”  Id.  
 
2. The Obligation to Pay Highway Tolls  
 
Applying this framework to the obligation to pay 
highway tolls, we conclude it does not satisfy the definition of 
“debt” under the FDCPA. 
 
Step One: Arising out of a Transaction.  At the first step, 
we consider the two arguments raised by St. Pierre as to why 
the obligation to pay highway tolls arises out of a “transaction.”  
His first, that the transaction out of which his obligation to pay 
highway tolls arises is the E-ZPass Contract, is a non-starter.  
We were clear in Pollice that the original source of the 
obligation—not the subsequent method of collection—
determines whether an obligation constitutes “debt” under the 
FDCPA, 225 F.3d at 402, and, like the payment plan in Pollice, 
                                                          
obligation of a tortfeasor to pay damages is not “debt” under 
the FDCPA because it is not a “consensual or contractual 
arrangement” but rather amounts to a “damage obligation[] 
thrust upon one as a result of no more than her own 
negligence”); Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 
2009) (same); Bass v. Stolper, Koritzinsky, Brewster & Neider, 
S.C., 111 F.3d 1322, 1326 (7th Cir. 1997) (same). 
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the contract with E-ZPass is merely “directed toward the 
collection of the original obligations, not any obligations which 
may have arisen from [the E-ZPass Contract],” id. at 403. 
 
St. Pierre attempts to distinguish Pollice by arguing that 
the E-ZPass Contract imposes a $50 per violation fee even for 
“inadvertent violations” that are otherwise exempted by 
statute.  Reply Br. 10-11.  But this too is a false start.  St. Pierre 
cites to no authority for that reading of the E-ZPass Contract, 
and the E-ZPass Contract expressly provides that drivers are 
required to pay penalties only “as required by law,” JA 66, and 
thus appears coextensive with the statutory requirement that 
“an owner that proves an inadvertent toll violation has occurred 
shall be required only to pay the toll and shall not incur the 
administrative fee.”11  N.J. Admin. Code § 19:9-9.2(b). 
                                                          
11As the District Court observed, we do not foreclose 
the “possib[ility] that certain obligations, unrelated to tolls and 
penalties, may arise out of the [E-ZPass Contract],” St. Pierre, 
2017 WL 1102635, at *10 n.6, and thus amount to independent 
liabilities that qualify as “debt,” see, e.g., Brown v. Transurban 
USA, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 3d 809, 842 (E.D. Va. 2015) (holding 
that E-ZPass “overcharges” that arose out of the E-ZPass 
contract itself were “properly understood” as a consensual 
transaction).  Here, while the District Court astutely observed 
that the E-ZPass monthly membership fee of $1 “could 
arguably be considered a ‘debt’ because it was created by the 
[E-ZPass Contract], and not by operation of law,” St. Pierre, 
2017 WL 1102635, at *10 n.6, St. Pierre does not allege that 
RMCB attempted to collect the $1 membership fee, and, even 
if he had, he would be hard pressed to explain how that distinct 
and de minimis obligation could convert the obligation to pay 
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St. Pierre makes more headway with his second 
argument in support of a “transaction,” i.e., that he did not have 
to drive on the toll roads and voluntarily chose to do so.  Here, 
we find the analogy to the utilities in Piper compelling:  Just 
as “a homeowner voluntarily elects to avail himself of 
municipal water/sewer services . . . and thereby incurs an 
obligation to pay for such services . . . based on the amount of 
water [the homeowner] chose to use,” 396 F.3d at 233 n.8, so 
too does St. Pierre, by electing to drive on toll roads (or 
authorizing another driver to do so in his vehicle), “voluntarily 
elects to avail himself” of the Authority’s highway services in 
exchange for a per-use fee—a classic pro tanto exchange, id. 
  
We acknowledge this presents a closer case than Piper 
in two respects.  For one, the obligation to pay highway tolls is 
non-consensual in the sense that it involves a statutory 
requirement.  But that is not dispositive:  In Pollice, we 
recognized that water and sewer obligations were “debt,” 
notwithstanding the fact that “a City ordinance . . . provides for 
a twelve percent annual rate of interest on claims for unpaid 
sewer charges,” 225 F.3d at 386, and we observed in dictum 
that a sales tax—which is, of course, a statutorily-imposed 
obligation—might constitute “debt” because, unlike property 
tax, sales tax “arguably arises from the sale transaction” for 
goods or services rather than “from the fact of ownership,” id. 
at 402.  In neither discussion did we indicate that the mere 
codification of an obligation precluded the exchange from 
constituting a transaction.   
 
                                                          
highway tolls into one that arises out of the E-ZPass Contract, 
see Pollice, 225 F.3d at 402-03. 
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For another, highway tolls are, in a sense, a “tax for the 
use of highways,” Safeway Trails, Inc. v. Furman, 197 A.2d 
366, 376 (N.J. 1964), and there is some facial appeal to the 
argument that highway tolls, like the property taxes in Pollice, 
derive “from the fact of ownership,” 225 F.3d at 402, because 
liability is assessed on the registered owner of the vehicle that 
made use of the “highway,” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 27:23-25, even if 
that vehicle was operated by a different driver, id. § 27:23-
34.2(b).  But in contrast to the property taxes in Pollice, or the 
per capita taxes in Staub, the liability imposed on vehicle 
owners is not merely from the fact of ownership or residency 
but from the voluntary election to drive the owned vehicle on 
toll roads.  See Pollice, 225 F.3d at 401; Staub, 626 F.2d at 278.  
That is, St. Pierre would have no obligation to pay highway 
tolls had he chosen to use alternative routes or to keep his car 
parked rather than drive on the Authority’s roads; the 
homeowners in Pollice and the residents in Staub had no such 
choice.   
 
In sum, St. Pierre’s obligation to pay highway tolls does 
arise out of a “transaction” within the meaning of the FDCPA, 
15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5), but while that gives him some 
momentum, he cannot cross the finish line for an FDCPA claim 
unless “the subject of the transaction [is] primarily for 
personal, family, or household purposes,” id.  We thus turn to 
the next step of our inquiry.    
 
Step Two: The Subject of the Transaction.  Before we 
can determine whether the subject of a transaction is “primarily 
for personal, family, or household purposes,” id., we must 
identify the subject of the transaction itself: what is being 
rendered in exchange for payment?  Here is where the 
proverbial rubber meets the road, for while St. Pierre contends 
21 
 
that what he receives is access to New Jersey highways and 
bridges, what is “payable from tolls” under the New Jersey 
statute is the Authority’s mandate to “facilitate vehicular traffic 
and remove the present handicaps and hazards on the 
congested highways in [New Jersey],” and “to acquire, 
construct, maintain, improve, manage, repair and operate 
transportation projects.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 27:23-1.  As the 
New Jersey Supreme Court observed in City of East Orange v. 
Palmer, the Authority’s mission is “the construction and 
operation of a highway, on a self-sustaining toll basis.”  245 
A.2d 327, 330 (N.J. 1968). 
 
The toll booths dispersed throughout the roads, in other 
words, are merely the collection point for tolls, and access to 
the roads or bridges is thus incident to the payment of tolls, not 
the service rendered in exchange for them.  Instead, highway 
tolls “compensate the state for the cost, maintenance and repair 
of its highways,” Safeway Trails, 197 A.2d at 375, and in 
exchange for those tolls all drivers benefit from “safer, faster, 
and more convenient travel in and through the State,” id. at 
370.   
 
Step Three: The Primary Purpose of the Subject of the 
Transaction.  Having identified the services rendered in 
exchange for highway tolls, it is clear that what St. Pierre 
receives in exchange for the payment of highway tolls is not 
the private benefit of a “personal, family, or household” service 
or good but the very public benefit of highway maintenance 
and repair.  15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).  This stands in stark contrast 
to the services rendered in Pollice and Piper, where, as the 
District Court recognized, “the homeowners consumed the 
water and sewer services, within the confines of their home, 
for their personal benefit,” St. Pierre, 2017 WL 1102635, at 
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*8, or, for that matter, any transaction in which the service 
rendered in exchange for the consumer’s money is personal or 
individual to the consumer, see, e.g., Franklin v. Parking 
Revenue Recovery Servs., Inc., 832 F.3d 741, 745 (7th Cir. 
2016) (holding that the obligation to pay for an individual 
parking space in a government-owned parking lot constitutes 
FDCPA “debt”).  Rather, the public nature of the construction, 
maintenance, or operations of highways steers the obligation 
away from a “debt” and towards the tax obligations in Staub, 
which, as we observed there, were not primarily personal 
because they were “used for more general purposes.”  626 F.2d 
at 278.  
 
Moreover, the fact that highway tolls resemble taxes—
while not a sufficient basis on which to conclude they do not 
arise out of a “transaction” at the first stage of our inquiry—
does at this step reinforce the conclusion that the services 
rendered are not primarily for personal purposes.  Like taxes, 
highway tolls are imposed for public benefit and “without 
reference to peculiar benefits to particular individuals or 
property.”  Staub, 626 F.2d at 278 (quoting Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1307 (5th ed. 1979)).  While one component of the 
obligation to pay highway tolls is the distance traveled, it is 
also, like taxes, largely determined categorically by the type 
and class of vehicle being driven12 and thus is not simply 
“metered in the normal fashion . . . based on the amount 
[used].”  Piper, 396 F.3d at 233 n.8.  And just as the amount 
paid in taxes does not entitle an individual taxpayer to “better” 
parks, schools, or government systems, the amount paid in tolls 
                                                          
12 See New Jersey Turnpike Authority Toll Calculator, 
http://www.njta.com/toll-calculator (last visited July 12, 
2018). 
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does not entitle the payor to better maintenance or construction 
of highways.  Rather, to the extent the services rendered by the 
Authority benefit an individual like St. Pierre, they do so only 
“secondarily.”  Staub, 626 F.2d at 278 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 
Focusing on access to the roads, St. Pierre contends that 
the benefit is personal and protests that because “[t]he FDCPA 
defines covered consumer debt based on the alleged debtor’s—
not a creditor’s—purposes,” his obligation to pay highway tolls 
should be considered “debt” because his purpose was to attain 
access not available to the general public and to serve the 
personal purpose of getting where he was going.  Appellant’s 
Br. 20-21.  That argument, however, mistakenly conflates two 
distinct inquiries: whether, subjectively, an individual chooses 
to enter into the transaction primarily for his own personal 
purposes, and whether, objectively, the subject of the 
transaction—that is, “the money, property, insurance, or 
services” being rendered, 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5)—is primarily 
for personal purposes.  While in some cases, the two will be 
aligned, as in the case of utilities, e.g., Pollice, 225 F.3d at 400, 
they are not where the subject of the transaction is the rendition 
of services that benefit the public generally.  And here, even 
accepting that road access could be considered a good or 
service in exchange for toll payments—and not merely an 
opportunity for toll collection—the other, far more significant 
services rendered by the Authority in exchange for highway 
tolls are the public services that follow from its statutory 
mandate, funded through tolls, “to acquire, construct, maintain, 
improve, manage, repair and operate transportation projects.”  
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 27:23-1.  The subject of the transaction, in 
other words, would still not be “primarily” for personal 
purposes.  
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In sum, the FDCPA is not implicated where, as here, the 
bulk, if not all of the services rendered, are made “without 
reference to peculiar benefits to particular individuals or 
property.”  Staub, 626 F.2d at 278 (quoting Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1307 (5th ed. 1979)).  St. Pierre’s toll liability thus 
does not constitute “an[] obligation . . . primarily for personal, 
family, or household purposes,” and does not qualify as “debt” 
under the FDCPA.  15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).  
  
IV. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
 
